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Bay, Tasmania 7005, AustraliaAbstract—People often ‘‘mind wander” during everyday
tasks, temporarily losing track of time, place, or current task
goals. In laboratory-based tasks, mind wandering is often
associated with performance decrements in behavioral
variables and changes in neural recordings. Such empiri-
cal associations provide descriptive accounts of mind
wandering–how it affectsongoing taskperformance–but fail
to provide true explanatory accounts – why it affects task
performance. In this perspectives paper, we consider mind
wandering as a neural state or process that affects the
parameters of quantitative cognitive process models, which
in turn affect observed behavioral performance. Our
approach thus uses cognitive process models to bridge
the explanatory divide between neural and behavioral data.
We provide an overview of two general frameworks for
developing a model-based cognitive neuroscience of mind
wandering. The first approach uses neural data to segment
observed performance into a discrete mixture of latent
task-related and task-unrelated states, and the second
regresses single-trial measures of neural activity onto
structured trial-by-trial variation in the parameters of
cognitive process models. We discuss the relative merits of
the two approaches, and the research questions they can
answer, and highlight that both approaches allow neural data
to provide additional constraint on the parameters of cogni-
tive models, which will lead to a more precise account of the
effect ofmindwanderingon brain andbehavior.We conclude
by summarizing prospects for mind wandering as conceived
within a model-based cognitive neuroscience framework,
highlighting the opportunities for its continued study and
the benefits that arise fromusingwell-developed quantitativehttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroscience.2015.09.053
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People often ‘‘mind wander” during everyday tasks,
temporarily losing track of time, place or current task
goals. Some estimates suggest that mind wandering
might occupy anywhere between 30% and 50% of our
everyday life (Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). Prominent
theories of mind wandering suggest that monotonous
tasks cause people to drift between various cognitive
states (e.g., Cheyne et al., 2009; Schooler et al., 2011;
Smallwood and Schooler, 2015). Such states can be clas-
sified as on task, reflecting an external focus on the pre-
sent stimulus environment, and off task, characterized
by internally directed cognitions that are largely decou-
pled from the external perceptual environment (e.g.,
Bastian and Sackur, 2013; Mittner et al., 2014). Mind/licenses/by/4.0/).
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decade from both behavioral and neural angles
(Weissman et al., 2006; Mason et al., 2007; Christoff
et al., 2009; Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010; Wilson
et al., 2014; Smallwood and Schooler, 2015). Neverthe-
less, there have been few attempts to combine the behav-
ioral and neuroscience approaches within a unified
model-based neuroscience framework, in order to
achieve a deeper and more coherent account of mind
wandering (for an exception, see Mittner et al., 2014).
In the laboratory, mind wandering is often studied in
the context of simple cognitive tasks, such as sustained
attention tasks, where task performance is measured in
terms of simple behavioral variables, such as choice
accuracy or response time (Smallwood and Schooler,
2006). Throughout the task, participants are occasion-
ally interrupted with ‘thought probes’ that ask the partic-
ipant to make an introspective judgment whether they
were on task or off task in the preceding trial or trials
(e.g., Giambra, 1995; Smallwood et al., 2004; Seli
et al., 2015a). Responses to thought probes have been
used in various ways to classify experimental trials into
on-task and off-task states, and those classified states
are then related back to task performance (e.g.,
Christoff et al., 2009; Stawarczyk et al., 2011b; Mittner
et al., 2014). Using this approach and similar variants,
mind wandering has been related to performance decre-
ments in the ongoing primary task in behavioral vari-
ables – such as higher error rates and response time
variability (e.g., Cheyne et al., 2009; Bastian and
Sackur, 2013) – and changes in neural recordings –
such as increased activity in the default mode (or task
negative) network (e.g., Christoff et al., 2009;
Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; Stawarczyk et al., 2011b;
Smallwood et al., 2013).
Such empirical associations provide descriptive
accounts of mind wandering – how it affects task
performance – but do not provide true explanatory
accounts – why it affects task performance, since extant
theories of mind wandering do not provide generative
accounts of cognition. Rather, empirical mind-wandering
phenomena are explained at the level of verbal
theorizing (we expand on this point in ‘Contrasting
qualitative and quantitative models of cognition’ section).
Verbal theories can easily lead to imprecise predictions
and consequent difficulties in discriminating between
competing theories of the processes of interest. For
decades the psychological literature has explored why
task performance changes as a function of experimental
manipulations using quantitative cognitive process
models. Cognitive models decompose observed
behavioral variables in experimental tasks, such as
choices and/or response times, into latent components
of processing that are typically of greater interest for
theory development, such as efficiency of processing
and response caution. Thus, quantitative cognitive
models have the potential to bridge the gap between
abstract high-level theories and observed data, which
moves toward mechanistic accounts of mind wandering.
In this article we outline mind wandering as
conceived within a model-based cognitive neuroscienceframework (Forstmann and Wagenmakers, 2015;
Forstmann et al., in press), where cognitive process
models bridge the explanatory divide between neural
and behavioral data. In particular, we consider mind
wandering as a neural state or process that affects the
parameters of cognitive models, which in turn affect
observed behavioral performance. We argue that adopt-
ing a quantitative cognitive modeling framework can pro-
vide a fresh perspective on various measurement issues
and theoretical proposals from the mind wandering liter-
ature. We do not aim to provide a comprehensive review
of the mind wandering literature (for excellent reviews,
see Smallwood and Schooler, 2006, 2015), but rather
provide a perspective on this novel approach. At the
conclusion of the article we provide some broader per-
spectives on the application of the model-based cogni-
tive neuroscience framework to the study of mind
wandering, including applications to neuropsychological
patients and psychopathology.
The frameworks we discuss aim to identify the
occurrence and predictors of mind wandering during
performance in discrete events (experimental trials)
over an extended period (the course of an
experiment). In this sense, we focus on identifying
when people mind wander on a trial-by-trial basis; our
approaches are agnostic about the content of task-
unrelated thoughts. Our goal is to use cognitive
models to move toward mechanistic accounts that
explain what happens to ongoing task performance
when the mind begins to wander. Our general
approach, however, is more broadly applicable than
just to the specific study of mind wandering itself. To
the experimental psychologist studying another topic
for example, task-unrelated thoughts are contaminants
– trials influenced by a process that is not relevant to
the cognitive process of interest. Even if one has no
interest in studying mind wandering per se, the
quantitative frameworks we discuss can be considered
principled methods for removing contaminant trials
from data sets.
Furthermore, we focus on alternatives to the routine
adoption of introspective thought probe methods to
identify mind wandering. Although thought sampling has
furthered our current understanding of mind wandering,
it suffers from a number of potential issues. For
example, thought sampling may be subject to situational
factors, such as social desirability biases or the
observer effect, or limits on metacognitive abilities, such
as the level of insight participants have into their current
state (Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; Schooler et al.,
2011; Seli et al., 2015a). Even if introspective judgments
can reliably report on underlying states, we argue that
they do not provide insight into the mechanisms that influ-
ence mind wandering or its effect on ongoing task perfor-
mance. In the final sections of this review, we outline
methods that conceptualize thought probes as an out-
come measure, not the identifier, of mind wandering. That
is, we argue that thought probes represent another
source of data – just like choices and response times,
or neural measures – that can constrain model predictions
(i.e., be treated as a dependent variable) rather than the
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an independent variable to classify choices or response
times).
COMPUTATIONAL MODELS OF COGNITIVE
PROCESSES
Cognitive process models are quantitative
implementations of theories about the processes
involved in a range of cognitions – memories, attention,
decisions, and so on. They permit precise quantitative
tests of the potential cognitive mechanisms and
processes that generate behavioral data. In particular,
they allow the researcher to hypothesize and stringently
test empirically the effect of experimental manipulations
on cognitive processes, and to quantify the evidence for
competing formal accounts of the processes under
investigation. Here we provide a very brief overview of
the advantages of cognitive modeling. For a
comprehensive introduction we refer the reader to
Lewandowsky and Farrell (2011) or Forstmann and
Wagenmakers (2015).
Cognitive models decompose the distribution of
observed variables, such as choice proportions and/or
response times, into latent components of processing.
These components, often referred to as model
parameters, are of greater interest to theorizing than
raw behavioral measures. For instance, the study of
recognition memory often measures various response
proportions across a number of experimental conditions.
A model such as signal detection theory takes the raw
response proportions – hit rates and false alarm rates,
which can be ambiguous to interpret in isolation – and
transforms them through the quantitative machinery of
the model into constructs of greater theoretical interest,
such as memory strength and response bias (Green
and Swets, 1966).
In addition to a more coherent theoretical outlook,
cognitive models can provide behavioral insights that
cannot be obtained from analysis of raw behavioral
data. The well-known speed-accuracy tradeoff, for
example, describes how one can make faster decisions
at the expense of accuracy, and vice versa (Reed,
1973; Pachella, 1974; Wickelgren, 1977). The tradeoff is
defined by the relationship between the choices people
make and the time taken to make them. Conventional
analysis of choice or response time data – where each
dependent variable is treated independently – cannot dis-
criminate between accounts based on a speed-accuracy
tradeoff or changes in the efficiency of information pro-
cessing. The class of cognitive models known as sequen-
tial sampling models has been used to study the speed-
accuracy tradeoff in great detail (e.g., Ratcliff and
Rouder, 1998; Forstmann et al., 2008; Rae et al., 2014),
as well as many other decision-related phenomena, and
is the class of models we discuss in this review as they
deal with similar issues as signal detection theory but gen-
eralized beyond choices to also account for response
times. We note that, although we illustrate ideas as
applied to sequential sampling models, the methods we
highlight in this manuscript generalize to other classes
of computational cognitive models.Sequential sampling models of decision-making
We focus on mind wandering during simple yet attention-
demanding tasks through the lens of sequential sampling
models; well-developed cognitive process models that
have provided great insight to the mechanisms
underlying speeded decision-making in the psychology
and neuroscience literatures (e.g., Busemeyer and
Townsend, 1993; Usher and McClelland, 2001; Smith
and Ratcliff, 2004; Brown and Heathcote, 2008; Ratcliff
and McKoon, 2008). Sequential sampling models assume
that simple decisions – such as whether a string of letters
represents a word, or whether a motion stimulus moves in
one direction or another – are made through a process of
gradually accumulating sensory information to a thresh-
old. Throughout the paper we discuss the diffusion model
as an exemplar of the family of sequential sampling mod-
els (for reviews, see Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008; Voss
et al., 2013; Forstmann et al., in press). We note that all
methods outlined in this paper can equally well be used
with other sequential sampling models, and debates
about particular models and their assumptions are periph-
eral to our main thesis.
Fig. 1 provides a schematic overview of the decision
process in the diffusion model. The model assumes that
noisy information is gradually sampled from the
stimulus. The information is accumulated in a decision
variable that tracks support for one response option
over another. The process continues until it reaches one
of two decision boundaries, triggering a response. In
Fig. 1, the decision is whether the stimulus is moving to
the left or right of a display, so the boundaries
correspond to a response of ‘left’ or ‘right’. The
predicted response corresponds to the boundary that
was crossed, and the predicted response time is the
time it took for the decision variable to reach the
boundary plus an offset time that accounts for peripheral
processes such as encoding the stimulus display and
executing a physical response (such as a button press).
The parameters of the diffusion model, and sequential
sampling models in general, relate to constructs that are
relevant to our understanding of mind wandering. For
example, the average rate of information accumulation –
the drift rate – indexes the efficiency of information
processing; the distance between the boundaries
indexes the level of response caution; the starting point
relative to the response boundaries indexes response
biases, because the decision variable can start closer to
one boundary than another; and the time taken for the
aspects of response time not accounted for by the
decision itself, known as non-decision time. Modern
implementations of sequential sampling models also
consider variability in model parameters from one trial to
the next (Ratcliff and Tuerlinckx, 2002). For example,
trial-to-trial variability in drift rates reflects the assumption
that the efficiency of processing is variable over time
(Ratcliff, 1978).
The utility of cognitive models such as the diffusion
model relies critically on the validity of its latent
constructs – the model parameters. One approach to
ascertain the validity of the model parameters is through

























Fig. 1. Schematic illustration of the drift diffusion model of decision-making. We thank Don Van Ravenzwaaij for supplying the code to draw this
figure.
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latent constructs (for a detailed introduction, see
Heathcote et al., 2015a). For example, Ratcliff and
Rouder (1998) showed that manipulating task difficulty
led to changes in the drift rate parameter (processing effi-
ciency) but not boundary separation (response caution),
and instructions to emphasize fast or cautious decision-
making led to changes in boundary separation but not drift
rate, even when both factors were manipulated simultane-
ously. Furthermore, provision of greater reward for one
response over another leads to a shift in the start-point
of information accumulation toward the higher reward
boundary, and the non-decision time parameter increases
when the motor component of the response is more chal-
lenging to produce (Voss et al., 2004). These results indi-
cate that the diffusion model parameters have well
validated interpretations.
The parameters of sequential sampling models can be
inferred from behavioral data. From each experimental
condition, the probability of a correct response and the
observed distribution of response times for correct and
error responses are used to infer the values of the
model parameters that were most likely to have
generated the observed data. In this way, the model
decomposes observed variables, choices and response
times, into parameter values that allow researchers to
draw deeper conclusions, such as whether a change in
response time across conditions is better described as a
change in the efficiency of processing (drift rate) or
cautiousness of responding (boundary separation). For
tutorials on parameter estimation in sequential sampling
models, we refer the reader to Donkin et al. (2009),Vandekerckhove and Tuerlinckx (2008), and Voss and
Voss (2007).
One of the great benefits of estimating the parameters
of cognitive process models is that the quality of the
model fit to data can be used to determine which model
from a set of candidates embodying different theoretical
accounts provides the best account of a phenomenon
(e.g., mind wandering). This procedure, referred to as
model evaluation, comparison or selection, consists of a
range of techniques that quantify the empirical support
for models with different parameterization or different
architectures (for a detailed review, see Shiffrin et al.,
2008). For example, one may wish to compare which of
two diffusion models provides the best account of an
experimental effect, a model that attributes the effect to
the drift rate parameter (processing efficiency) or bound-
ary separation (response caution). Model selection tech-
niques can also be used to select between models with
different architectures; for example, whether a particular
data set is best explained by the diffusion model or
another sequential sampling model such as the linear bal-
listic accumulator (Brown and Heathcote, 2008; e.g.,
Heathcote et al., 2015b, in press). In the context of mind
wandering, by evaluating which model parameterization
or architecture provides the most parsimonious account
of behavioral data we gain insight to the nature of the pro-
cesses underlying mind wandering, a point we return to
throughout the manuscript. When used appropriately,
quantitative model evaluation decisively selects between
competing theories of psychological processes. It is not
possible to garner the same level of empirical support
from qualitative or ‘verbal’ models, which are the most
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(Lewandowsky and Farrell, 2011).
Finally, in addition to the theoretical advantages of
using sequential sampling models to understand data, at
a practical level existing models are at a stage of
maturity where they can be used to understand data in
experimental paradigms that are commonly used to
study mind wandering. For example, there are well-
developed sequential sampling models of the go/no-go
task (e.g., Gomez et al., 2007), commonly studied in the
mind-wandering literature as the sustained attention to
respond task (SART; Robertson et al., 1997; Smallwood
et al., 2004; Smallwood and Schooler, 2006; Smilek
et al., 2010). There are also variants of sequential sam-
pling models that account for less commonly used tasks
in the mind wandering literature, such as the stop-signal
task (Logan et al., 2014).
Contrasting qualitative and quantitative models of
cognition
In all scientific endeavors, data can only be interpreted and
understood through the lens of a theory. Cognitive process
models, such as the diffusion model, can be thought of as
quantitative instantiations of a theory: a set of input
parameters is transformed through a series of functions
– the formalization of the model – to generate
quantitative behavioral predictions. The predictions can
be rigorously tested against data – via parameter
estimation and model selection – to determine whether a
model provides a good account of patterns in data and
interpretable theoretical conclusions.
In contrast, existing theories of mind wandering can be
thought of as qualitative theories. Qualitative theories are
described in verbal terms and are thus less strictly defined
than quantitative theories, leading to less precise
behavioral predictions. Take as an example the
performance decrements in laboratory-based tasks such
as the SART that have been interpreted through the lens
of different theories of mind wandering. One key
hypothesis states that executive resources are used to
perform goal-directed tasks, and this finite pool of
resources is depleted when the mind disengages from
the task – since task-unrelated thoughts consume
resources – thus leaving fewer resources for the ongoing
task, resulting in suboptimal performance (Smallwood
and Schooler, 2006). This resource model is consistent
with data showing that increased mind wandering is asso-
ciated with poorer performance on resource-demanding
tasks (Mrazek et al., 2012) and activation of executive net-
works (Christoff et al., 2009). An alternative explanation
proposes that people switch between states of perceptual
coupling – when attentional processes are directed to sen-
sory input – and a task-disengaged state of perceptual
decoupling – when attention is diverted from sensory input
to inner thoughts (for detailed reviews, see Schooler et al.,
2011; Smallwood and Schooler, 2015).
The resource and perceptual decoupling models
provide intuitively appealing accounts of mind
wandering, and both are able to explain general
patterns in data. However, both theories posit different
explanations for its occurrence, which raises thequestion of which model is best supported by data;
when two (or more) verbal models predict qualitatively
similar patterns in data it is not clear how to select
between theories. A pertinent example is a related
debate about whether mind wandering depletes
executive resources or is the result of an executive
failure (see McVay and Kane, 2010, 2012a,b;
Smallwood, 2010). The very existence of this controversy
highlights the difficulty of discriminating between theories
formulated at an abstract, verbal level. Quantitative mod-
els differ in this respect: the functions that make up the
model architecture quantitatively constrain model predic-
tions, which provide greater ability to select between the-
ories. To illustrate this point we borrow Lewandowsky and
Farrell’s (2011) example from the ‘hard’ sciences.
For centuries, it was believed that the sun and the
planets orbited the earth according to Ptolemy’s
geocentric model of the solar system. Copernicus
challenged the dominant geocentric model, proposing
that the planets follow a circular orbit around the sun.
The predictions of the Copernican heliocentric model
provided an approximately equally good account of
planetary motion as the Ptolemaic geocentric model.
Without a metric to define a good account of the data –
a quantitative modeling comparison – it would not have
been possible to reach this conclusion. Since both
models provided an equivalent fit to data, the more
parsimonious Copernican model was eventually
preferred over the Ptolemaic model. Later, Kepler
proposed that planetary motion follows an elliptical
rather than circular orbit. The Copernican and Keplerian
models thus differed in a quantitative manner – circular
versus elliptical orbits – but not at a qualitative level –
both theories propose that planets orbit the sun. The
Keplerian heliocentric model provided a more
quantitatively precise account of the data than the
Copernican model and was thus preferred. This
example highlights a transition from theories that differ
in a qualitative manner – a geocentric to a heliocentric
model – to theories that differ in a quantitative manner –
circular to elliptical orbits. Discriminating between the
two heliocentric models was only possible through
quantitative comparison of model predictions.
Returning to theories of mind wandering, if the
resource and perceptual decoupling theories make
similar verbal predictions – for example, that one
experimental condition will make more errors than
another – and this pattern is observed in data, it is
difficult to discriminate between theories of the potential
mechanisms or processes underlying mind wandering.
Instantiating theories in a quantitative modeling
framework more tightly constrains the prediction space;
for example, two quantitative models of mind wandering
might predict differences in the rate of increase in SART
errors across conditions. Differences in predictions
between models are thus more likely, because the
predictions are more precise, leading to more decisive
conclusions about theories. To borrow from physics
once more, Einstein’s description of the mass–energy
equivalence (E=mc2) would not be nearly as useful, or
well-known, if it simply stated that mass can be
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of the stated equivalence that makes the theory so
valuable.
The foregoing discussion is not intended to disregard
theoretical advances in mind wandering. To the contrary,
we argue that existing theories should be further
developed to move them into the realm of quantitative
models, to increase their explanatory power and provide
greater insight to mind wandering. Moving from a
qualitative to quantitative theory involves multiple steps.
We illustrate the nature of some of the conceptual
questions one must consider in this process using the
resource model as an example. Relevant questions
might involve, for example, how one formalizes (i.e.,
mathematically defines) ‘resources’; whether people
have a single pool of resources or multiple pools;
whether the pool of resources is a fixed quantity or
variable across time, contexts, and people; and how
resources are functionally mapped and allocated to task
performance. A major advantage of this approach is that
each decision about the implementation of a particular
theoretical assumption in the model can be quantitatively
tested using corresponding models. Determination of
which model provides the best account of the data
discriminates among the underlying theoretical positions.
We argue that theories of psychological constructs
should be developed in such a quantitative, and not
qualitative, framework, mirroring progress in other
disciplines.
An illustrative example of this approach comes from
the study of prospective memory, which involves
remembering to perform an action or task at some time
in the future, often while completing a primary task.
Extant theories suggested that prospective memory
tasks consume and re-direct resources from the primary
task, which lead to decrements in ongoing task
performance (e.g., Smith, 2003). In a sequential sampling
model framework, a simple hypothesis would map
remembering to do a prospective memory action, which
reduces resources, to a reduction in drift rate on the ongo-
ing task. A recent model-based analysis (Heathcote et al.,
2015b) indicated this is not the case: people instead
raised their level of response caution, consistent with
the verbal theory that participants delayed their ongoing-
task responses so that they do not preempt prospective
memory responses (Loft and Remington, 2013). This
was a counter-intuitive yet highly informative outcome
that changes the course of theorizing about prospective
memory. It is possible that a quantitative analysis of
resource theories of mind wandering might lead to similar
outcomes. Testing such hypotheses first requires those
theories to be developed in a quantitative framework.
We do not pursue such extensive theoretical
developments of quantitative models of mind wandering
here. Rather, we use sequential sampling models as a
vehicle to demonstrate how methods from model-based
cognitive neuroscience can be used to advance the
study of mind wandering and constrain future
quantitative models of mind wandering. Likely the
sequential sampling framework as it stands is too simple
to provide a complete account of mind wandering.Nevertheless, we believe that it provides a useful
starting point for the development of comprehensive yet
quantitatively precise models of mind wandering.
We now present an outlook on general model-based
frameworks that can be used to understand mind
wandering as a mediator that drives the parameters of
cognitive models, in particular sequential sampling
models. The approaches differ in their psychological
assumptions and the research questions they can
address. Common across the frameworks, however, is
the assumption that on-task and off-task states have
different data-generating parameters, and these
parameter differences mediate the observed behavioral
effects. The proposals outlined below are presented as
a sample of possible model-based frameworks to
operationalize mind wandering and are by no means
intended to provide an exhaustive overview of possible
modeling approaches or conclusive theoretical insights
regarding the information processing origins of mind
wandering.LATENT MIXTURE MODEL FRAMEWORKS FOR
CLASSIFYING MIND WANDERING INTO TASK-
RELATED AND TASK-UNRELATED COGNITIVE
STATES
We use the term mixture model to refer to a class of
methods that assumes the presence of discrete
generating sources in the observed data. For example,
one might assume that there are periods of high task
engagement and periods of mind wandering, which we
refer to as on-task and off-task states, respectively; this
is similar to the perceptual decoupling theory of mind
wandering (Smallwood and Schooler, 2015). In the mix-
ture framework, the two states are assumed to be mutu-
ally exclusive and driven by different parameter values
in a cognitive model. For example, the on-task state might
be characterized by a larger drift rate than the off-task
state, with all other parameter values remaining constant
across the two states. Such a model would reflect the psy-
chological assumption that mind wandering has a selec-
tive influence on the efficiency of task information
processing. The aim of mixture modeling is to use the
observed data to infer, separately for each decision trial,
which of the latent or hidden (i.e., unobservable) states
gave rise to the observed datum – the on-task process
or the off-task process.
A coarse yet common approximation to identify
mixtures in data is to assume that certain values – such
as a response time faster or slower than a cutoff value
– represent different processes. For example, while
studying the effects of sleep deprivation, Ratcliff and
Van Dongen (2011) used the convention of classifying
responses slower than 500 ms in a psychomotor vigilance
task as attentional lapses, which may indicate an
increased propensity for mind wandering. This approach
requires two explicit steps: researchers first select an
appropriate cutoff value to categorize responses (e.g.,
500 ms), sometimes after having observed the data, and
then inference is performed on differences in the propor-
tion of responses in the two categories. The problem with
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assumes the cutoff value from the first step was deter-
mined a priori, and furthermore that it was the only way
in which the data could have been divided (for further dis-
cussion of this issue, see Hawkins et al., in press-a). Even
in situations when the value was derived from previous lit-
erature (as in Ratcliff and Van Dongen, 2011) it does not
preclude the possibility that other sub-divisions of the data
were possible.
Our review focuses on two methods for mixture
modeling that overcome the aforementioned problems
by identifying discrete, latent classes of responses:
Bayesian latent mixture models and machine learning
approaches that are informed by an independent stream
of data.
Using behavioral data to inform latent mixture
models
Although multiple approaches exist for estimating mixture
models from data, we focus on Bayesian methods since
they confer many benefits for cognitive modeling,
including a one-step analysis for identifying mixture
models, simultaneous estimation of participant- and
group-level parameters via hierarchical modeling, and
quantifying uncertainty in parameter estimates via
posterior distributions over parameters. For an overview
of the advantages of Bayesian parameter estimation
methods and a practical guide to their implementation
we refer the reader to Lee and Wagenmakers (2013).
Bayesian mixture models are conceptually
straightforward and have been applied to a range of
data analysis and cognitive modeling applications (e.g.,
Steyvers et al., 2009; Lee and Wagenmakers, 2013;
Scheibehenne et al., 2013; Bartlema et al., 2014). We first
assume that one or more discrete states or processes
generated the observed data. As a toy example, we might
assume that each observed datum from a set of continu-
ous measurements (e.g., height) is drawn from one of two
normal distributions (e.g., men and women). On average,
the population mean of the male population is larger than
the female population, but there is a considerable stan-
dard deviation such that some males are shorter than
some females. Now consider the situation where we only
have access to the measurements of height but not the
sex of the person that provided each measurement. The
computational problem is to use the observed distribution
of height, and our assumption that both males and
females contributed height measurements, to infer the
properties of the two populations (i.e., the means and
standard deviations of the male and female distributions,
and the proportion of males to females) and to assign a
probability to each datum that the person was male or
female. The probability of classification to one class or
the other is proportional to the prior probability of the
two populations and the ratio of the density of the height
measurement under the parameters of the respective
population distributions.
It is conceptually simple to scale the Bayesian mixture
model of the previous example to applications of
psychological interest; for example, assuming that an
observed data set is comprised of a mixture of on-taskand off-task cognitive processes. Vandekerckhove et al.
(2008) considered a similar case, by assuming that some
trials in a perceptual decision-making experiment were
contaminants – data points that were not generated by
the (diffusion model) process of interest – and hence were
not germane to the primary research question (for a related
approach see Vandekerckhove and Tuerlinckx, 2007).
Although Vandekerckhove et al. (2008) did not intend to
study mind wandering, their approach indirectly modeled
processes relevant to mind wandering: an experimental
psychologist typically aims to identify contaminant trials
to remove them from the analysis. The mind-wandering
researcher aims to identify those same ‘contaminants’
and study the processes that generated them.
Vandekerckhove et al. (2008) defined a Bayesian
latent mixture model that classified trials into one of three
categories: decision trials generated from the diffusion
model, guesses, and delayed startups. Here, we focus
on Vandekerckhove et al.’s (2008) hypothesis that some
trials have a delayed startup. Under this hypothesis there
are two discrete types of diffusion process: the first deter-
mines performance when the participant is focused on the
task at hand, and the second determines performance
when the participant’s focus is elsewhere – a contami-
nant, in Vandekerckhove et al.’s (2008) terminology.
The on-task and off-task diffusion processes were
assumed to have the same data-generating parameters
except for a ‘delayed startup’ in the off-task process,
implemented as a larger value of the non-decision time
parameter than the on-task process.
Because quantitative models generate precise
predictions, the assumption that the off-task process
differed to the on-task process in only one parameter
(non-decision time) still leads to dissociable predictions
as compared to changes in another model parameter
(say, drift rate). The delayed startup theory of mind
wandering predicts that off-task trials lead to slower
responses than on-task trials, on average. This occurs
since an increase in the non-decision time parameter
leads to a slower onset of the decision process, and
therefore a global upward shift in the distribution of
response times and longer decision latencies, on
average. This account is plausible when a participant
may be engaged in task-unrelated thoughts when the
decision stimulus appears on screen. Once the stimulus
appears it takes some amount of time for the participant
to re-orient to the task at hand. Once re-focused, the
participant makes a decision in an otherwise similar
manner to trials where they were focused on the task at
stimulus onset (i.e., with the same starting point, drift
rate, and boundary separation as the on-task diffusion
process). As this example illustrates, since the non-
decision time parameter has no bearing on the diffusion
process itself, the delayed startup theory predicts that
the on-task and off-task processes do not differ in
decision outcome (correct, error) or variability in
response times.
Clearly, however, task-unrelated thoughts have been
linked to not only changes in response times but also to
decreases in decision accuracy (e.g., Cheyne et al.,
2009; Stawarczyk et al., 2011a; McVay and Kane,
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strict interpretation of the delayed startup theory is, there-
fore, easily falsified. However, it is straightforward to aug-
ment the delayed startup process with an additional
change in, say, drift rate. Such a change might be inter-
preted as a degraded diffusion process that took longer
to start (larger non-decision time) and was less efficient
(lower drift rate). This augmented model predicts longer
response times, on average, as before, but the reduction
in drift rate predicts decreased decision accuracy and
increased variability in the distribution of response times.
This change in model parameterization may then account
for the empirically observed pattern of longer response
times and an increased proportion of errors in off-task rel-
ative to on-task behavior. The key point is that a range of
models assuming a mixture of discrete data-generating
processes can be proposed and quantitatively tested
against data to determine their appropriateness, and
modified as necessary.
The delayed startup hypothesis and related proposals
using Bayesian latent mixture modeling aim to classify
trials into one of a number of mutually exclusive
categories. A critical assumption of this framework is
that each decision is considered an independent
random sample from one of the generating distributions
(i.e., on-task diffusion process, off-task or ‘delayed
startup’ diffusion process), which means the approach
assumes no sequential structure. This is at odds with
our intuitions about mind wandering: one would expect
an increased chance of an off-task trial following an off-
task (versus on-task) trial. Indeed, the mind wandering
literature has produced empirical results that are
consistent with this intuition. For example, mind
wandering-related variability in response times can
follow phasic increases and decreases over the course
of perceptual experiments (e.g., Bastian and Sackur,
2013; Bompas et al., 2015), and alterations in neural
activity can precede performance deficits including erro-
neous responses up to 30 s before the behavioral out-
come is observed (e.g., Eichele et al., 2008; O’Connell
et al., 2009; Macdonald et al., 2011). These findings sug-
gest that a more precise model of mind wandering ought
to account for the temporal correlation of switching
between on-task and off-task states, which can be
obtained with hidden Markov models (HMMs).Using behavioral data to inform HMMs
As in latent mixture modeling, HMMs, also known as
dependent mixture models, use the observed output of
a process (response times, decision accuracy) to infer
the ‘hidden’ state or process that generated the data
(on-task, off-task). However, and crucially, HMMs
generalize latent mixture models by assuming the
discrete generating states are related over time through
a Markov process rather than independently distributed.
This allows HMMs to estimate a critically informative
piece of information for the study of mind wandering –
transition probabilities; for any given trial, the probability
of switching from an on-task state to an off-task state,
or from an off-task state to an on-task state.Reliable estimation of the transition probabilities in a
HMM requires a signature or regularity in the data that is
related to the discrete states of interest. In the mind
wandering literature, for example, periods of increased
response time variability have been associated with
greater propensity for task-unrelated thoughts (e.g.,
Cheyne et al., 2009; Stawarczyk et al., 2011a; Bastian
and Sackur, 2013; Seli et al., 2015a). Bastian and
Sackur (2013) noted phasic increases and decreases in
the coefficient of variation of response times (RTCV), a
standardized measure of response variability, in the com-
monly studied SART, where self-reported ratings of task-
unrelated thoughts were associated with larger RTCV.
Bastian and Sackur (2013) used patterns in the observed
RTCV to inform a HMM that inferred go responses tended
to occur in ‘runs’ of on-task, and then off-task, states.
Specifically, the authors estimated that the probability of
switching from on-task to off-task from one trial to the next
was lower than the probability of the reverse state change,
switching from off-task to on-task (.11 versus .18). This
result raises two important issues. First, the off-task or
mind-wandering state was more volatile than the task-
focused state (i.e., larger transition probability). Second,
the transition probabilities were not complementary (sum
to one) which implies that trials are not independently dis-
tributed according to a particular base rate of on-task ver-
sus off-task states; neighboring time points are more likely
to be related than distant time points. The transition prob-
abilities also allow one to derive the expected duration of
runs of on-task and off-task states: the mean duration of
an on-task episode was 1/.11 = 9.09 units of experimen-
tal time, which translates to 18.2 s under Bastian and
Sackur’s (2013) division of experimental time (i.e., exper-
imental sessions were split into many units each of 2 s
duration), while off-task episodes were shorter, on aver-
age – 11.1 s (1/.18  2).
In this context, HMMs provided great insight to the
transition from task-engaged states to mind wandering
and back again, including the intriguing proposition that
the off-task state is more volatile than the on-task state.
However, Bastian and Sackur’s (2013) approach was
restricted to a purely descriptive model of response time
distributions (the ex-Gaussian model). Such descriptive
models provide precise fits to data but their parameters
lack an interpretation in terms of cognitive processes
(Matzke and Wagenmakers, 2009), and thus provide lim-
ited insight into the cognitions driving task performance in
the two discrete states. Although more research is
required to rigorously link HMMs in mind wandering to
cognitive process models, we can derive some predic-
tions from Bastian and Sackur’s (2013) results. In partic-
ular, the HMM used the variability of observed response
times as a signal that discriminated between the two dis-
crete states. Specifically, the distribution of off-task
responses was more positively skewed than on-task
responses, and hence contained more variable response
times (i.e., larger RTCV). In sequential sampling models,
the variance in predicted response time distributions can
increase when (1) the drift rate decreases, indicating
reduced efficiency of information processing, (2) there is
larger trial-to-trial variability in drift rate, indicating greater
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stimuli, or (3) there is greater boundary separation, indi-
cating more cautious responding. Any of these potential
outcomes could provide a neat mapping to theorizing that
mind wandering increases the variability of responding as
well as effects on the overall speed of responding.
Using neural data to inform machine learning
approaches
The latent mixture model and HMM approaches assume
there is a mixture of on-task and off-task states in the
structure of the model, and then reverses the generative
process to estimate the proportion of on-task versus off-
task trials in the data. An alternative to the problem of
inferring a mixture in data is to use data-driven methods
where one stream of data (e.g., neural recordings) is
used to classify another (e.g., behavioral data). There
are varying levels of complexity in how neural measures
can be used to classify trials as belonging to a particular
state. We first provide a brief overview of a simpler and
relatively common (non-machine learning) approach to
using neural data to classify trials as belonging to a
particular state, with a hypothesized example. We then
outline what is, to our knowledge, the only application of
machine learning approaches in the mind wandering
literature (Mittner et al., 2014).
In the mind-wandering literature it has been
hypothesized that increased power of pre-stimulus alpha
activity is related to attentional lapses and the
propensity to engage in task-unrelated thoughts
(O’Connell et al., 2009; Macdonald et al., 2011; Bompas
et al., 2015; though see also Braboszcz and Delorme,
2011). Alpha waves are neural oscillations in the 8–
12 Hz frequency range measurable via electroen-
cephalography (EEG) and magnetoencephalography
(MEG). Although alpha activity has only recently become
a focus of study in the mind wandering literature, it has
been studied in depth in the attention literature, where it
is generally found that alpha activity increases during
wakeful rest and is thought to index disengagement from
the external visual environment (e.g., Cooper et al., 2003;
Ergenoglu et al., 2004; Van Dijk et al., 2008; Mathewson
et al., 2009; Romei et al., 2010). Specifically, alpha oscil-
lations are thought to reflect cortical inhibition of task irrel-
evant areas, a top-down control process that prevents
irrelevant brain regions from interfering with task perfor-
mance (Klimesch et al., 2007). One hypothesis is that
state changes involved in mind wandering – transitioning
from on-task to off-task – are associated with changes in
the localization of alpha oscillations, such that cortical
inhibition processes shift from task irrelevant areas to task
relevant areas. This would lead to decrements in perfor-
mance while simultaneously freeing the mind to wander.
To test the hypothesis that alpha activity is related to
task-unrelated thoughts, one could use a classification
approach that first sorts trial-level data on pre-stimulus
alpha power recorded from task-relevant regions. The
sorted data are partitioned into ‘low’ (i.e., more on-task)
and ‘high’ (i.e., more off-task) alpha sets and a cognitive
model is fit to the two sets of behavioral data (for a
similar approach using multivariate pattern analysis in arelated domain, see Ratcliff et al., 2009). Quantitative
model comparison is used to determine the most parsi-
monious account of the data: which parameters should
be estimated separately across the on-task and off-task
trials and which should remain fixed. To the extent that
pre-stimulus alpha activity is related to mind wandering,
parameter differences across the low and high alpha sets
can be attributed to the processes that differ between the
two cognitive states. Although potentially insightful, there
is at least one major drawback of the split-half approach: it
imposes an artificial categorization (‘low’ versus ‘high’
pre-stimulus alpha activity) on a continuous measure
(alpha power). This forced categorization is not necessar-
ily meaningful since borderline trials are forced into one
group or another (i.e., higher alpha power in the ‘low’
group, and vice versa). One can circumvent this problem
by removing a middle segment of data, such as removing
the middle third of trials with intermediate alpha power
and only comparing the lowest third to the highest third;
however such classification schemes use data
inefficiently.
An alternative to median-split segmentation rules are
data-driven, machine learning algorithms that are
trained to classify trials as on-task or off-task on the
basis of an observed variable or variables. For example,
Mittner et al. (2014) had participants perform a stop-
signal task, a common measure of response inhibition,
while recording functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) activity and pupil diameter (see Fig. 2). A thought
sampling method was used where, at pseudo-random
times throughout the behavioral task, the participant
was asked to indicate whether their focus was on-task
or off-task in the previous trial. The self-report ratings
were used as labels for the neural data to train a classifi-
cation algorithm to learn distinct patterns of neural activity
that were predictive of the self-reported on- (or off-) task
rating. Once trained, the algorithm probabilistically classi-
fied individual trials as on-task or off-task for the unlabeled
(majority of) trials. Mittner et al. (2014) fit various indepen-
dent stochastic accumulator models (variants of the diffu-
sion model) to the data classified as on-task and off-task
to determine which parameters provided the best account
of the difference in performance between the on-task and
off-task states. Quantitative model comparison was used
to determine the most parsimonious account of the data,
which was a model that indicated on-task relative to off-
task trials were more likely to have larger drift rates for
the go and stop processes (implicating more efficient
stimulus processing), and a larger response threshold
(implicating more cautious responding). Bode et al.
(2012) provided a related example with applications to
attentional processing that used multivariate pattern clas-
sification of EEG data.
The machine learning approach to trial classification
has three primary advantages. Firstly, it provides a
means for (probabilistically) classifying the on-task
versus off-task status for all experimental trials. This
overcomes a distinct downside to the common approach
in thought sampling on-task versus off-task behavior that
can only classify the trials that immediately preceded the
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Fig. 2. Summary of Mittner et al.’s (2014) analysis procedure. fMRI and pupil diameter recordings were preprocessed and theoretically derived
features were extracted and fed into a machine learning classifier. Self-reported mind wandering scores were used as labels and the classifier was
trained to predict them. After training, all trials were classified and the neural and behavioral signature of on-task and off-task behavior was
analyzed. Reproduced with permission from Mittner et al. (2014).
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from which to understand the neural and behavioral
outcomes of mind wandering. Secondly, although it does
not explicitly model the temporal structure of the task like
HMMs, temporal relationships are implicit in the (typically
autocorrelated) neural signal used to classify trials. Since
there are neural signatures that reliably predict mind
wandering, and mind wandering occurs in temporally
structured phases, then neural activity can be used to
implicitly classify temporally related periods of on-task
and off-task behavior. Finally, the specification of data-
driven models with many regressors predicts the
occurrence of mind wandering with greater accuracy
than is generally possible with single regressors.Limitations of mixture model approaches to
classifying mind wandering
Although the mixture modeling approaches outlined here
are appealing, they are not without their drawbacks.
Most importantly, mixture models assume a latent
mixture of on-task and off-task states and do not
consider the possibility that mind wandering exists
along a continuum that drifts between periods of
greater task engagement through to task-unrelated
thoughts. At a theoretical level, this may or may not be
consistent with one’s views on the occurrence of mind
wandering. Mixture models also raise practical issues
with parameter estimation. Cognitive models tend to
have high dimensionality (i.e., require estimation of
multiple parameters from data), such as the drift rate,
start point, boundary separation, and non-decision time
parameters of the diffusion model. In general, as model
dimensionality increases there is a requirement for
larger and more informative data sets to ensure
reliable parameter estimation. The problem is even
greater in mixture models because they aim to infer
discrete data-generating sources, which necessitates
estimation of more model parameters (i.e., separate
model parameters for each discrete state).There can also be problems with estimating Bayesian
latent mixture models and HMMs from behavioral data
alone. It is probable that the data generating states we
seek to explore in the study of mind wandering – on-task
and off-task performance – do not predict highly
dissociable effects on observable behavior; at least not
to the extent that they predict qualitatively different
response outcomes in data. Unlike the example problem
with the height of men and women, which are well
separated on average, it is challenging to unambiguously
classify decision and response time data to a single
discrete data-generating source when the discrete states
differ only in model parameterization (and not model
structure). For example, Vandekerckhove et al.’s (2008)
delayed startup model classified only .6% of a representa-
tive participant’s trials as contaminants (approximately 43
trials from a total of 8000 trials). The mind wandering liter-
ature, however, suggests that task-unrelated thoughts are
far more common, occupying anywhere between 30% and
50% of our time in everyday life (Killingsworth and Gilbert,
2010). Although Vandekerckhove et al. (2008) were not
proposing a model of mind wandering, adoption of their
model as a candidate account of mind wandering requires
one to accept that (1) mind wandering is far less common
than has been reported, (2) the behavioral signature of
mind wandering is not recovered by Vandekerckhove
et al.’s (2008) model, or, more likely, (3) behavioral data
alone have limited ability to constrain mixture parameters
in cognitive models of mind wandering (i.e., there is limited
diversity in behavioral data to identify mind wandering and
hence inform the parameters of models with multiple pro-
cesses). Supporting the latter proposal does not cast
doubt on the latent mixture modeling approach in general.
Rather, it suggests that accurately identifying mixture
parameters and transition probabilities between latent
classes requires richer sources of data to inform parame-
ter estimation, such as behavioral data complemented by
simultaneous neural recordings during task performance.
However, even incorporating neural measurements to
the classification problem is not without its challenges.
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learning approaches is that it can be difficult to identify
the effect size of the unique contribution of specific
neural signals when using non-linear classifiers. The
final approach we discuss overcomes some problems of
the mixture model approaches by incorporating explicit
neural measures into a hypothesis-driven, regression-





In this section we discuss flexible regression-based
modeling approaches. Regression approaches are part
of a more general class known as generative models
that can allow, for example, simultaneous modeling of
multiple streams of data, such as behavior and neural
responses, and how those streams may interact to
generate the observed data. Although we do not discuss
such detailed possibilities here, this flexibility and ability
to simultaneously model multiple streams of data opens
exciting possibilities for future research.
Using neural data as single-trial regressors on the
parameters of cognitive process models
Here, we restrict our focus to a particular regression
approach that specifies covariates on the parameters
of cognitive models in the form of single-trial
regressors. The values of the regressors are derived
from each trial of an experiment and could involve
stimulus-related properties such as brightness
(Vandekerckhove et al., 2011) or item similarity
(Hawkins et al., in press-b), or neural measures such
as single-trial fMRI and/or EEG activity (e.g.,
Cavanagh et al., 2011; Borst and Anderson, 2015;
Frank et al., 2015; Nunez et al., 2015; Turner et al.,
2015). The single-trial measures of stimulus-related or
neural activity are then regressed onto structured trial-
by-trial variation in the parameters of cognitive process
models. This approach is powerful because it defines
functional roles of stimulus properties or neural activity
as causes, not correlates, of observed behavior, via
their hypothesized influence on parameters of cognitive
models. Regression approaches also overcome the
restrictive assumption of the mixture models that
assume participants are in mutually exclusive on-task
or off-task states. Finally, regression approaches main-
tain the benefits of the machine learning and HMM
approach because they implicitly model temporal corre-
lations in task performance, to the extent that temporal
information is present in regressors such as neural
activity.
We argue that regression approaches that use single-
trial regressors are an excellent example of the
explanatory power that can be obtained when operating
within a model-based cognitive neuroscience framework.
Analyzing neural and behavioral data in a single
framework provides greater insight into both streams of
data than is possible by considering either stream inisolation. To our knowledge, there have been no
attempts to model the neural and cognitive processes
underlying mind wandering in regression frameworks
with single-trial regressors. We first provide an example
of the framework in a related domain followed by a
hypothesis for the study of mind wandering.
Frank et al. (2015) simultaneously recorded fMRI and
EEG activity while participants completed a
reinforcement-learning task, and then regressed single-
trial neural activity onto parameters of the diffusion model.
They tested the hypothesis that mediofrontal theta band
activity in the EEG signal and the BOLD response in the
fMRI signal of the subthalamic nucleus (STN) and pre-
supplementary motor area modulated the response
boundary, by estimating linear regression coefficients for
the effect of the neural measures on the value of the
model parameter. A positive regression coefficient for
STN activity, for example, indicates that trials with
increased STN activity lead to greater boundary separa-
tion, and vice versa.
Although there has been no attempt to apply single-
trial regression to the study of mind wandering, we see
two main advantages that may follow from such
applications: enhanced understanding of the neural
and behavioral consequences of mind wandering, and
potential for more reliable measures of mind
wandering. To continue the illustrative example from
the previous section, one could test hypotheses about
a particular neural measure (such as pre-stimulus
alpha power) and its relation to task performance as
indexed by a model parameter (e.g., drift rate) in mind
wandering. Specifically, one could calculate a
normalized measure of pre-stimulus alpha power at
electrodes over task-relevant regions for each trial for
use as a single-trial regressor on the drift rate
parameter. In this way, alpha power is hypothesized to
modulate drift rate at the individual trial-level: a
positive regression coefficient for a particular subject
indicates that an increase in that subject’s pre-stimulus
alpha activity causes a corresponding increase in the
drift rate on their subsequent trial, and the reverse
interpretation for a negative regression coefficient. The
size of the regression coefficient relating pre-stimulus
alpha power to drift rate gives a measure of the effect
size of alpha power on the efficiency of information
processing, separately for each subject. A hierarchical
modeling approach, which simultaneously models
subject-and group-level parameters, provides a
principled approach to aggregate the value of the
regression coefficient over subjects, allowing for clear
hypothesis tests (e.g., is the regression coefficient
different to zero). The single-trial regression approach
is both flexible and powerful, because it allows precise
hypothesis tests of the effect of any neural measure of
interest and its relation to any parameter of a cognitive
model. Furthermore, the approach is not restricted to
single-trial dynamics. For example, it has been shown
that decreased deactivation of the default mode
network can precede an erroneous response up to
30 s before the error occurs (e.g., Eichele et al.,
2008). Such hypotheses about long-range neural
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ogous manner to single-trial regressors.
We see one final promise of single-trial regression for
the study of mind wandering: the ability to conceptualize
thought probes as an outcome measure, not the
identifier, of mind wandering. The regression approach
described here allows one to reverse the direction of
inference compared to other methods of analysis, such
as the machine learning approaches. There, responses
to thought probes are a pre-requisite for the analysis as
they serve as the labels to train a classifier. Here,
however, thought probes are not required in the model
fitting procedure at all. Rather, a model is implemented
with a single-trial neural regressor thought to drive on-
task performance, such as pre-stimulus alpha power.
The value of the neural measure on thought probe trials,
combined with its regression coefficient, can be used to
generate predictions for the observed probe responses
– on-task or off-task. The extent to which the model
predicts responses to thought probes indicates the
extent to which the neural measure reliably indexes
mind wandering. In this way, we move toward
developing models that predict task-related and task-
unrelated behavior and the frequency of task-unrelated
thoughts.GENERAL DISCUSSION
The past decade has seen much progress in our
understanding of the behavioral and neural
consequences of mind wandering. Mind wandering also
has great lay interest and important ramifications in
everyday functioning. Nevertheless, the abstract nature
of mind wandering and task-unrelated thoughts make
them difficult to reliably measure, and consequently
difficult to develop a complete theory.
In this perspectives piece we have argued that
cognitive process models have the potential to illuminate
the mechanisms and processes that underlie the task-
unrelated thoughts that occur when people lose focus
from a primary task. The approaches we outlined are
applicable not only to commonly used experimental
paradigms in the mind wandering literature, such as the
SART, but they generalize to a range of other
paradigms. These include tasks used to measure
response inhibition, thought to be impaired during mind
wandering, such as the stop-signal and Erikson flanker
tasks, which have been modeled with sequential
sampling models (e.g., White et al., 2012; Logan et al.,
2014). The use of a model-based framework also frees
one from the use of highly simplified tasks that are used
to induce boredom, and, by extension, mind wandering.
For example, one can use the frameworks we discussed
in paradigms that are less commonly used to study mind
wandering, such as standard perceptual decision-making
tasks that typically involve experimental manipulation of
factors such as choice difficulty and the relative emphasis
placed on the speed or accuracy of responding. Finally,
although we have only outlined relatively simple
laboratory-based tasks, there is no in-principle reason
why the models and methods we have described cannotbe used to account for performance and mind wandering
in more complex tasks (e.g., Eidels et al., 2010). We
believe that considering a broader range of experimental
paradigms within a model-based framework will lead to
more general conclusions about the influence of mind
wandering on completion of everyday tasks.
The model-based frameworks we outlined provide
different perspectives from which to consider the study
of mind wandering. Each approach has advantages
and disadvantages and the method one adopts ought
to be guided by the research question of interest. For
example, the mixture model approaches assume
mutually exclusive data generating states – such as an
on-task state and an off-task state. In contrast, the
single-trial regression approach allows one to explore
mind wandering along a continuous dimension that
may gradually transition between on-task and off-task
poles. Regardless of the chosen framework, the
routine incorporation of cognitive models to the study
of mind wandering will lead to a deeper understanding
of the mechanisms underlying task-focused and task-
unrelated thoughts and their relationship with neural
activity and behavioral performance. The mixture
models that incorporate neural data and the single-trial
regression frameworks both allow one to determine
which neural measures – connectivity measures, pupil
dilation, increased blood flow in specific cortical or
subcortical regions, oscillatory activity, and so on – are
the strongest predictors of mind wandering. In this
sense, one could develop a range of models that differ
in whether they assume discrete on-task and off-task
states or a single-trial regression approach, and the
set of neural predictors employed. Once applied, we
can use model selection techniques to determine
which model provides the most parsimonious account
of the behavioral data.
In addition to enhancing our understanding of mind
wandering, the predictive models that follow from the
model-based frameworks outlined here can aid
identification of contaminants in experimental tasks. One
way to approach the contaminant problem could be
through the development of ‘automated’ model fitting
routines. These routines would be supplied with neural
and behavioral data to produce output of trials classified
as more likely to be on task or off task, and in turn the
total percentage of time spent mind wandering in an
experiment. Such analyses can only follow from a
model-based approach because whether a trial is likely
to have been on task or off task is assessed relative to
the model assumed for the data.
Using model-based methods to study mind
wandering in a broader context
In this article we presented perspectives on the use of
methods from model-based cognitive neuroscience to
understand mind wandering in simple tasks in normal
populations. Once these methods have been developed
and validated, there is no reason they cannot be
extended to research questions of interest to real-life
contexts. One application may be in further
understanding ‘‘goal neglect”, where a person can
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fails to act on those requirements (Duncan et al., 1996).
Goal neglect is well known to occur at higher rates in
patients with frontal lobe damage (e.g., Luria, 1966), but
has also been observed in normal adult populations –
where it is correlated with working memory capacity
(Kane and Engle, 2003), fluid intelligence and instruc-
tional complexity of the task (Duncan et al., 2008, 2012;
Bhandari and Duncan, 2014) – and in normally develop-
ing children (Roberts and Anderson, 2014). Goal neglect
shares similarities to mind wandering – for example, it
could be conceived as ‘‘zoning out”, or a particularly pro-
found attentional lapse – and it is feasible that the model-
based methods presented here could be used to further
understand goal neglect. For example, it is known that
people with lower working memory capacity tend to mind
wander more often during attention demanding tasks (e.
g., Kane et al., 2007; McVay and Kane, 2009; Kane and
McVay, 2012). Resource models of mind wandering pro-
pose that the frequency of task-unrelated thoughts
increases when there are fewer resources available for
the primary task. It is, therefore, possible that people with
lower working memory capacity have fewer executive
resources to apply to goal-directed tasks. Such hypothe-
ses could be tested within an existing cognitive modeling
framework – similar to Heathcote et al.’s (2015b) study of
resource theories in prospective memory – or in newly
developed quantitative models that formalize the role of
‘resources’ in task performance. Initial work suggests that
lower working memory capacity and higher rates of mind
wandering are related to greater variability in drift rate
throughout the experiment, which matches observed
extreme response times and higher error rates in mind
wandering (McVay and Kane, 2012a). Given such devel-
opments, one could use cognitive modeling to understand
differences in mind wandering, and possibly goal neglect,
in normal and patient populations.
Mind wandering is also intimately linked with
psychopathology. The most prominent example is
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), where
clinical diagnoses are related to greater rates of
spontaneous mind wandering (Shaw and Giambra,
1993; Seli et al., 2015b). However, a similar relationship
is observed in non-clinical samples between greater
ADHD symptomatology and spontaneous but not deliber-
ate mind wandering (Seli et al., 2015b), which also trans-
fers to real-life contexts (Franklin et al., in press). Mind
wandering has also been implicated in a range of other
psychopathologies including depression and depressive
symptomatology (Watts and Sharrock, 1985; Deng
et al., 2014), dysphoria (Smallwood et al., 2007) and neg-
ative mood (Smallwood et al., 2009), anxiety in social con-
texts (Mrazek et al., 2011), and schizophrenia (Shin et al.,
2015). In a separate line of research, these clinical disor-
ders, and others, have been examined through the lens of
sequential sampling models, which have led to detailed
understanding of empirical phenomena in clinical
domains (e.g., Heathcote et al., in press; for an overview,
see White et al., 2010). We believe that the independent
study of psychopathology and mind wandering, and psy-
chopathology and cognitive modeling, can be integratedwithin the model-based neuroscience frameworks we
have proposed in this article.
Finally, model-based approaches that use neural
measures to predict mind wandering have potential for
practical applications, depending on the ease of
acquiring the neural measure. As a simplified example,
we might find that a relatively easily acquired measure –
such as pupil diameter – is predictive of reductions in
the efficiency of information processing (i.e., lower drift
rate) during mind wandering (cf. Mittner et al., 2014). This
finding could be incorporated in workplaces where lapses
of attention can have large consequences, such as air
traffic control (cf. Casner and Schooler, 2015). While the
user is completing their ongoing task, pupil diameter could
be monitored online. When the system observes patterns
of pupil dilation known to be predictive of mind wandering
(such as decreased pupillary response to stimuli) it could
alert the operator to waning attention, potentially before
the off-task state has reduced the efficiency of information
processing and its subsequent effect on behavior.
We have provided only a brief overview of a few
stylized examples of the theoretical and applied benefits
that may follow from adopting a model-based cognitive
neuroscience of mind wandering. We believe that
routine investigation of mind wandering that combines
neural and behavioral data with cognitive process
models will continue to grow as a topic of study in its
own right, and lead to a more complete understanding
of task-related and task-unrelated thoughts on brain and
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